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Messianism, Teleology, and
Futural Justice in Raúl Zurita’s
Anteparaíso
Scott Weintraub
The University of Georgia

Anteparadise was conceived as a total structure, a trajectory beginning with
the experience of everything precarious and painful in our lives and concluding with a glimmer of happiness. I’ll never write a Paradise, even if such a
thing could be written today; but if it could, it would be a collective enterprise
in which the life of everyone who walks the face of the earth would become
the only work of art, the only epic, the only Pietà worthy of our admiration. I
won’t write it, but that is the outcome I desire.
—Anteparadise, Raúl Zurita (1984)1

This epigraph, taken from Zurita’s introductory note to the English translation of his second book of poetry (Anteparaíso in the Spanish original),
emphasizes and at the same time calls into question the forward-looking and
teleological thread that runs through the course of his poetic project. The
© Michigan State University Press. CR: The New Centennial Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2007, pp. 213–238. issn 1532-687x
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Chilean poet was a founding member of the neo-avant-garde group CADA
(the Colectivo de Acciones de Arte) that intervened in the South American
scene of writing in the mid-1970s and early 1980s by way of a series of public
and poetic installations, which provocatively questioned the relationship
between art and the praxis of life during General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973–89). Zurita’s own early poetry engaged a series of allegorical
and biographical self-mutilatory gestures—he did in fact burn his own cheek
with acid in 1975—and thereby explored the violence done to language and/
as body writing under military rule. The trajectory of Zurita’s poetic career
spans four decades and culminated in 2000 when he was awarded the Chilean Premio Nacional de Literatura.
To return to the epigraph quoted above, Zurita’s introductory comments
are particularly suggestive given the way in which his poetry has been
predominantly read. It has most often been considered via its allegorical
relationship with violence under Pinochet’s authoritarian regime, and has
been framed by questions of religion, sacrifice, testimony, and corporality.2
The ray of hope emanating from Zurita’s poetic messianism and visionary
ecstasy—which tends to align the sacrificial violence done to the poetic body
with discourses of institutional violence under dictatorship—has shaped the
dominant critical reaction to his writing.
The epigraph, however, appears to dispel the egocentric, self-messianistic
visions that otherwise seem to characterize Zurita’s work. Or at least, we could
say, the epigraph disassociates the poet himself from the promise of a futural
textual paradise, thereby responding in a productive way to criticism of the
way in which poetic authors project themselves onto the lyrical voice. The
critic Jorge Fondebrider, for example, sweepingly accuses the Chilean poetic
tradition as a whole of fundamentally “confusing the figure of the poet with
poetry itself ” (Masiello 2001, 301). On one hand, the epigraph’s conception of
futurity effectively distances Zurita, on a larger thematic level, from the more
strict conceptualization of religious transcendence suggested by his evocation of Dante’s Divine Comedy cycle and the temporal realization of Paradise.
But at the same time, the epigraph’s focus on the collective “writing” of the
work that would entail Paradise marks a series of interesting movements in
Anteparadise’s particular textual economy. Anteparadise’s resistance to the
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possibility of an empirically futural Paradise ends up reconfiguring the temporality of Paradise as a construct more ethically “worthy of its name”—more
ethical, that is, than any project for the actual achievement of the collective
“perpetual peace” to which Zurita ostensibly refers.
My essay thus takes a different path in following the reinscription of
hope for the redemption of Chile’s wounded body in Anteparadise—which
is where the predominant critical reading of Zurita’s poetry locates its point
of departure. In its suggestion of the interrupted teleology of justice, Zurita’s
Anteparadise engages a very Kantian system in such a way as to hold itself
back from the “end” that it “thinks” it is proposing. By interrogating Anteparadise’s specific teleological workings vis à vis a reading of Immanuel
Kant’s political writings and the Critique of Judgment, my article suggests that
Anteparadise configures the coming of the messianistic other as a deferred
messianistic future. At the same time, my reading is informed by Jacques
Derrida’s writings on the horizon-less “to-come” “structure” that describes
the ghostly futurity of justice and democracy, as elaborated in recent books
such as Specters of Marx and Rogues, among others.
Turning to the particular visionary textuality of Anteparadise, we can
see how Zurita’s exploration of the beaches, skies, seas, and mountains of
Chile assumes the very form of the physical shapes evoked—in a way that
recalls Pablo Neruda’s monumental vision of the Latin American landscape
in Canto General (1950).3 With each section of the text zooming in to almost
a microscopic view of geographic, geopolitical, and biopolitical features, it
is significant that this forward-looking, visionary work should begin with
images of the sky-writing installation “La vida nueva” (“The New Life,” 1982).
Zurita describes this project as
a homage to minority groups throughout the world and, more specifically, to
the Spanish-speaking people of the United States. This poem is the conclusion of the Anteparadise. When I first designed this project, I thought the sky
was precisely the place toward which the eyes of all communities have been
directed, because they have hoped to find in it the signs of their destinies;
therefore, the greatest ambition one could aspire to would be to have that
same sky as a page where anyone could write. (1984)
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The particular futurity of Zurita’s multiple comments about “La vida
nueva” and Anteparadise will frame our readings of the necessarily postponed
“paradise-to-come” that Zurita’s text engages—even at the risk of falling into
the kind of reductionist/intentional fallacy argument that Fondebrider discusses. There is a striking insistence on naming divine attributes in “La vida
nueva”—in fact, the first fourteen “lines” of the sky-written poem begin with
“mi dios es”:
mi dios es hambre

mi dios es cancer

mi dios es nieve

mi dios es vacio

mi dios es no

mi dios es herida

mi dios es desengaño

mi dios es ghetto

mi dios es carroña

mi dios es dolor

mi dios es paraiso

mi dios es

mi dios es pampa

mi amor de dios

mi dios es chicano (Zurita 1997, 9)
my god is hunger

my god is cancer

my god is snow

my god is emptiness

my god is no

my god is wound

my god is disillusionment

my god is ghetto

my god is carrion

my god is pain

my god is paradise

my god is

my god is pampa

my love of god

my god is chicano (Zurita 1984, 1)

Each of these lines was traced out in the sky-space, and photos of the first
three sky-written lines immediately follow the typed text of “La vida nueva”
in Anteparadise.4 This poem’s lines seem to resist the temporal dissolve of the
sky-writing medium, since the invocation of “mi dios” persists in the sky due
to its frequency; it is as if the divine power of the Word possesses a special
resistance to disappearance. Cast in terms of nouns whose connotations are
predominantly negative, Zurita’s exploration of the relationship between the
human and the divine in “La vida nueva” is underscored by the intimate
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nature of the lyrical invocation of “MI DIOS,” followed by a specific attribute of God that modifies “his” God. The dissemination of these installation
photos throughout the text of Anteparadise also continually (and figurally)
forces the reader to look upward toward the firmament by deterritorializing
the circulation of writing. Zurita thus appropriates the sky as democratic
reading-space and plays with the supposed permanence of the written word
via the rapid dissipation of the celestial letters.
Following the text and photos of the first three “lines” from the June 1982
sky-written “La vida nueva,” Anteparadise is divided up into several sections:
it begins with a section of poetry titled “Las utopías,” containing a series
of poems about Chilean beaches construed as utopia; then moves through
“La marcha de las cordilleras” (“The March of the Cordilleras”); “Pastoral”;
“Esplendor en el viento” (“Splendor in the Wind”) containing “Tres escenas
sudamericanas” (“Three South American Scenes”), which discuss Zurita’s
self-mutilatory blindness, as well as several other poems; and finally culminates in a poetic afterword. While Anteparadise narrates a journey that retraces the sacrificial scars marking the Chilean landscape, it simultaneously
dislocates the poetic space from its physical “grounding” by beginning with
“Las utopías,” which nominally points to “no places” ( from the Greek u-topos)
in particular. The promise of a “brighter” future is announced immediately
in the first poem of this section, titled “Zurita”:
Como en un sueño, cuando todo estaba perdido
Zurita me dijo que iba a amainar
porque en lo más profundo de la noche
había visto una estrella. Entonces
acurrucado contra el fondo de tablas del bote
me pareció que la luz nuevamente
iluminaba mis apagados ojos.
Eso bastó. Sentí que el sopor me invadía (1997, 13)
As in a dream, when all was lost Zurita told me
It was going to clear
because in the depths of night
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he had seen a star. Then
huddled against the boat’s planked deck
it seemed that the light again
lit my lifeless eyes.
That’s all it took. I was invaded by sleep (1984, 5)

The clearing described here opens up a visionary, illuminated space in the
face of loss, which points to the themes of resurrection, recuperation, salvation, and messianism that typically structure most critical readings of Zurita’s
poetry. But to take a closer look at the disaster that plays out in the celestial
and terrestrial trappings of these poems—drawing together the ruin of the
image and the etymological and metaphorical separation from the stars put
forth as des-astre—the call emanating from this reading-event may not be
so neatly packaged and put aside in the move toward Paradise, Utopia, or
Redemption.5
This notion of the disaster as untimely and fundamentally ruinous
spreads through the series of poems located on the sandy shores of Chile’s
beaches, finding its way into the wounds, tears, calvaries, abysses, baptisms
that appear to give way to future hope in the trajectory toward one of the
final poems in the section—which in fact shares a title with the larger section
heading, “Las utopías.” The poems contained in “Las utopías” simultaneously
affirm and displace some sort of cognitive recognition of an event or location: “No eran esos los chilenos destinos que / lloraron” or “No eran esas
playas que encontraron sino más bien el clarear / del cielo frente a sus ojos”
(“Las playas de Chile I,” 1997, 14) [Those weren’t the Chilean fates they / wept
or Those weren’t the beaches they found by but the clearing / of the sky
. . . before his eyes (“The Beaches of Chile I,” 1984, 7)]. At the same time,
they collapse or compress the sky- and beach-spaces into an almost undifferentiated, forward-looking temporality that nevertheless delimits a future
characterized by a notion of justice that, as we will see, doesn’t quite “arrive”
in the way that Anteparadise’s messianistic tone might suggest.
In “Las playas de Chile V,” the Biblical vision of transgression is evidenced
by a Sodom and Gomorrah–like total complicity of the Chilean people in an
unnamed wrongdoing:
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Chile no encontró un solo justo en
sus playas apedreados nadie pudo
lavarse las manos de estas heridas (1997, 19)
Chile did not find a single just person on
its beaches battered no one could
cleanse his hands of these wounds (1984, 15)6

Situating the indelible, collective guilt of “la patria” as inextricably linked
to the terrain of the rocky beach (evoking a punishment by stoning), the
guilt of all chilenos—“Porque apedreados nadie encontró un solo justo en
esas playas / sino las heridas maculadas de la patria” (Because battered nobody found on those beaches a single just person / but the country’s tainted
wounds)—is underscored by violent and erotic images of the body turning
on itself:
I. Aferrado a las cuadernas se vio besándose a sí mismo
II. Nunca nadie escuchó ruego más ardiente que el de sus labios estrujándose contra sus brazos
III. Nunca alguien vio abismos más profundos que las marcas de sus propios dientes
en los brazos convulso como si quisiera devorarse a sí mismo en esa desesperada
(1997, 19)
I. He was seen clutching the timbers kissing himself
II. No one ever heard a plea more ardent than that of his lips pressed against his
arms
III. No one ever saw abysses deeper than the marks of his own teeth on his arms
convulsed as if in his despair he wanted to devour himself (1984, 15)

The abyssal wounds opened up by the contact between teeth and arm mark
the site of shifting configurations of self, other, ethics, and justice in this
poem. Floating, ghostly specters haunt the beaches—“como si en este mundo
no hubiera nadie que los pudiera / revivir ante sus ojos” (“as if there were no
one in the world who could revive / them before his eyes”)—dying an undead
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death hinging on a crucial as if (“como si”) that would foreclose on the possibility of resurrection. Calling into question the futural possibility of bringing
the dead back to life—which ostensibly refers to Judgment Day’s apocalyptic
revival of the dead—this curious play links potentiality with what appears
to be the impossibility of recuperation or redemption. It releases a series of
transformations and substitutions that seem to give rise to justice, or at least
to “a just person”:
IV. Pero sus heridas podrían ser el justo de las playas de Chile
V.
VI.

Nosotros seríamos entonces la playa que les alzó un justo desde sus heridas
Sólo allí todos los habitantes de Chile se habrían hecho uno hasta ser ellos el justo
que golpearon tumefactos esperándose en la playa (1997, 19–20)

IV. But the wounds could be the just person of the beaches of Chile
V.

We would then be the beach that raised them a just person from those wounds

VI. There alone all Chile’s inhabitants would have coupled until they became the just
person they beat swollen awaited on the shore (1984, 15)

The emergence of this prophesied “justo” through some sort of transubstantiation of wound into righteousness continues to be framed as a
conditional possibility through the use of the conditional grammatical tense
(“podrían ser,” “seríamos,” “se habrían hecho”) that does not definitively temporally situate this series of metamorphoses. These temporal dislocations
at play in Zurita’s poem evince a guiding thread of conditionality through
curious “as if ” clauses that have a ghostly relationship to teleology. Further
examination of this strongly Kantian guiding thread—which draws on the
kinds of political and teleological thinking that Kant elaborates in his socalled “political writings” as well as in the Critique of Judgment—shows how
this “untimely” passage uniquely reformulates the futurity of justice.7
My reading of the equivocal messianism that runs through Anteparadise’s curious teleological structure depends in large part on Kant’s use of
the term Leitfaden, which roughly translates as “guiding thread.”8 The particular textuality of this guiding thread, I think, is indicative of a principle of
reflective judgment that takes its guiding principle from itself, and therefore
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has interesting consequences for hermeneutical or allegorical readings that
would cast “the end of reading” (the goal of reading) as “the end of reading”
(to stop reading). From an analogical standpoint, the special privileges that I
am according to the “como si” in this passage mark a similar move in Zurita’s
poem that allows the process of “judgment” to move forward but not arrive
at a final purpose. This plays out in a very Kantian way, at least according
to the kinds of formulations about teleology that Kant outlines in his political writings and in the second part of the Critique of Judgment. On the one
hand, I am not explicitly concerned at this point with a detailed elaboration
of the development of Kant’s notion of judgment as a bridge between pure
and practical reason (which would find its origin in humankind’s judgments
of the beautiful and the sublime in nature in the first part of the third Critique). At the same time, some specific philosophical maneuvering will be
required to navigate the locus “where reason is seduced to poetic raving,” to
use Kant’s suggestion in the Critique of Judgment (295). With this in mind,
reading “through” the ghostly futurity of justice in Zurita’s Anteparadise (and
especially in “Las playas de Chile V”) is a productive approach to Kant’s
views on teleology and a deferred future. And an interesting consequence of
this particular reading is that the untimely future (de)constructed in, or by,
Zurita’s text might be better accounted for by a multifarious “structure” that
Derrida has described as “justice-to-come,” as we will see.
For Kant, the guiding principle at play in the third Critique allows one to
judge nature “as if ” it were organized by a supreme legislative being, “as if ”
it were made to be judged—without which it would be impossible to form a
coherent experience, and humankind would thus be left with the despair of
a formless, orderless existence. This principle thus permits several extrapolations pertaining to the political organization of societies, morality, and the
notion of justice, which are laid out in detail in Kant’s “Idea for a Universal
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” and “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical
Sketch” (1999b, 1999c). The importance of the guiding thread can be understood in terms of the Copernican revolution that turned philosophy’s primary
attention away from the noumenal (the “things-in-themselves”) to the phenomenal (the thing’s “givenness”), a discussion of the development of reason
(in a historical mode as Enlightenment), as well as the ordered principles of
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societies (the state of nature vs. civilization discourse so prominent in the
eighteenth century).
We might first examine Kant’s formulations in terms of the way in which
this principle of reflective judgment bears on the particular temporal hinge
of the “as if ” in Zurita’s Anteparadise. In this manner, we are able to turn from
these quasi-teleological moves toward a Kantian view of justice “needing” to
hold itself back—in a way that very much resembles the effort in “Las playas
de Chile V” to defer the realization of Utopia. This suggestion that justice
“needs” to hold itself back in Zurita’s text, lest this utopian vision result in
grave, apocalyptic consequences, is elaborated in the specific textual and
teleological economy of Anteparadise. Let us return for a moment to the
passage in question:
Porque apedreado Chile no encontró un solo justo en
sus playas sino las sombras de ellos mismos flotantes
sobre el aire de muerte como si en este mundo no
hubiera nadie que los pudiera revivir ante estos ojos (1997, 19)
For battered Chile did not find a single just person on its
beaches but the shadows of themselves floating in the air like
wraiths as if there were no one in the world who could revive
them before his eyes (1984, 15)

While these phantasmagoric shadows of the pueblo chileno might not contain among them the remains of even one just person, the articulation of
the “como si” makes it uncertain if in fact there does exist someone capable
of carrying out redemption and resurrection, as the last two lines would
suggest. Dislocating the temporal situation of this uncertain Savior, what
this stanza suggests is an equivocal reading of the possibility of salvation
in a book that should ostensibly mark a passage or prequel to Paradise. Anteparadise’s deferral of Paradise does not follow a mechanical causality that
would imply the empirically future arrival of this Redeemer, but rather finds
a “self-interrupting” teleological trajectory whose final “end” must necessarily not be the “end” or completion of a dialectical process. In this way,
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the Utopia announced by the arrival of the prophesied “justo” can only be
accompanied by the specters and ghosts proper to the apocalyptic destruction of the human race: “las sombras de ellos mismos flotantes / sobre el aire
de muerte como si en este mundo no / hubiera nadie que los pudiera revivir
ante estos ojos” (1997, 19) [“the shadows of themselves floating in the air like
/ wraiths as if there were no one in the world who could revive / them before
his eyes” (1984, 15)].
This opposition between the mechanical and the teleological is made
apparent in the series of physical transformations detailed toward the end of
“Las playas de Chile V.” Presented in axiomatic or list form, this poem seems
to bring forth the just person from collective wounds, while the chilenos (as
the shores of the stony beach) raise the just person from these wounds, and
witness the eventual righteousness of the pueblo who becomes the longawaited Redeemer:
IV. Pero sus heridas podrían ser el justo de las playas de Chile
V.
VI.

Nosotros seríamos entonces la playa que les alzó un justo desde sus heridas
Sólo allí todos los habitantes de Chile se habrían hecho uno hasta ser ellos el justo
que golpearon tumefactos esperándose en la playa (1997, 19–20)

IV. But the wounds could be the just person of the beaches of Chile
V.

We would then be the beach that raised them a just person from those wounds

VI. There alone all Chile’s inhabitants would have coupled until they became the just
person they beat swollen awaited on the shore (1984, 15)

Yet at the same time, the way in which these metamorphoses are so intricately folded on themselves on the liminal border of the beach seems to
warn of a danger inherent to a notion of mechanical causality in the advent
of the Messiah/Savior figure—opposing the apparent sequential nature of
these events of transubstantiation to Kant’s notion of teleology in the third
Critique.9 And while the prefigured emergence of this long-awaited, messianistic figure in Anteparadise at first appears to follow mechanical laws—as
evidenced by the rapid transformation of wound into Savior, chilenos into
beach that raised a just person, etc.—the book’s teleological foundation also
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depends on the deferral proper to the interruption of the “as if ” (“como si”)
that puts time so radically “out of joint.”10 The untimely nature of the coming
of justice, one might argue, is not necessarily a bad thing, given the historical
context of dictatorship and repression that overtly dialogues with Zurita’s
poetic production. This might at first appear to contradict my insistence on
the interruption of the odd teleological structure of the coming of the Messiah. But what Kant’s take on the teleological formulation of reflective judgment tells us about the coming of this chosen “justo” is that His coming must
always already be futural and deferred, lest we realize the “perpetual peace”
that would be the total annihilation of the human race. The implications of
these formulations for Zurita’s text are profound, especially when one considers that the nonteleological view of Utopia troubles this text’s temporal
placement “before Paradise” (Anteparadise). It is almost as if, vis-à-vis these
Kantian moves, there can be no writing after Anteparadise’s necessarily failed
or flawed targeting of Paradise.
Let us turn, for a moment, to this insistence on deferral and futurity,
since a detailed excursus on Kant’s writings on judgment and politics will
clarify this particular need to interrupt the teleological process in its purported move toward salvation and Utopia. This curious formulation finds
its origin in the search for a peace “worthy of its name,” which, according
to Kant’s highly studied “Perpetual Peace” essay (1999c) on the state of nature and the constitution of civil society, would not be merely a cessation
or suspension of hostilities. Kant begins his text with an anecdote about
a Dutch innkeeper’s signboard that named his residence “The Perpetual
Peace” alongside a picture of a graveyard. He is deeply troubled by the pessimism proper to this notion of peace as requiring the annihilation of the
human race. To describe the way in which perpetual peace must continually defer itself in the service of the preservation of the human race, Kant’s
essay initially calls into question the analogical move that links the genesis
of the state and the formation of an international federation. Where for
Kantian individuals unite at a higher level to leave the violence of the state
of nature, the individual states do not quite do the same to form a larger
international unit, since the internal organization of each state is not the
same as the lawlessness of the state of nature. Since there is still a need for
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a quasi-hegemonic setup (with superior and inferior parties), it is possible
to extend the trajectory of Kant’s argument to see how this is in fact the
worst possible outcome—even worse than the state of nature—because the
expansionist nature of the anarchical state (that desires to take over the
world) overturns the possibility of peace as something more than just a suspension of hostilities (Kant 1999c, 113). The following questions thus remain
in the context of reading Kant: Is perpetual peace necessarily the graveyard
to which he alludes in the first paragraph of the “Perpetual Peace” essay,
with his suggestion that peace might require the total destruction of humanity? Or does the logic of teleology—as we’ve been proposing—require a
series of interruptions or a holding back in the move toward an end, rather
than an asymptotic approach to and arrival at an Idea of justice? These are
issues that haunt Anteparadise’s problematic messianicity, in such a way as
to have productive consequences for the legibility of the futural visions that
predominate in Zurita’s book.
These questions find a response in Kant’s “Idea for a Universal History,”
in which he describes how the development of humankind’s still “immature”
faculty of reason seems to follow
a regular course in leading our species gradually upwards from the lower
level of animality to the highest level of humanity through forcing man to
employ an art which is nonetheless his own, and hence that nature develops
man’s original capacities by a perfectly regular process within this apparently
disorderly arrangement. (1999b, 48)

Whether or not Nature is purposive in its nurturing of these rational capabilities—since the savage violence of the state of nature “yielded” to the
creation of states governed by civil constitutions (however imperfect)—the
necessary push for humanity’s natural capacities to develop demonstrates,
for Kant, the “beneficial effects” (1999b, 49) of the evils of war, armaments,
and violence. This kind of protodialectical reasoning posits a “negative”
element that in turn stimulates the development of reason, thus bringing
out the importance of teleological thinking in Kant’s philosophy. Yet the immaturity of man’s moral reason is highlighted by the inachievedness of this
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cosmopolitan ideal: whereas Kant esteems humanity to be “cultivated to a
high degree by art and science . . . [and] civilised to the point of excess in
all kinds of social courtesies and proprieties” (1999b, 49), moral maturity
remains in the future, with merely the idea of morality existing in society. He
in fact predicts that “the human race will no doubt remain in this condition
until it has worked itself out of the chaotic state of its political relations in
the way I have described” (1999b, 49).11
In terms of this specific temporal formulation, the futural dimension of
this statement of moral (im)maturity points to somewhat of a strange structure in Kant’s work: although the above statement appears to describe an
empirical horizon of “maturity” (able to be localized in time and space as Enlightenment12), it is possible that the remark is indicative of a curious, disruptive movement that is further developed in his “Perpetual Peace” essay (1999c)
and the “Critique of Teleological Judgment” in the third Critique (1987). The
moment of the full realization of morality is one that, at least in the context of
Kant’s writings, can and must never arrive, much like the metaphorization of
the outcome of perpetual peace in the haunting, graveyard imagery.13 Where
Kant casts this logic of interruption, the resulting chimeras show reason’s
necessary possibility of going beyond its own limits and seeing the horizon
“where reason is seduced to poetic raving” (1987, 295). This suspended state
of futurity is what actually sustains Kant’s entire teleological system—that is,
the condition of possibility for teleology in general in Kant is the guaranteed
potential of its failure, or at least its radical interruption before arriving at the
“end” of the “end.”14 This trajectory “toward” a purpose or end doesn’t seem to
be adequately described even by a notion of an interrupted dialectic; rather
it is necessarily always already interrupted (or threatened with interruption)
at all possible points in time and space.
Th e guiding thread elaborated in this admittedly lengthy discussion
of Kant’s quasi-teleological system very much bears on the way in which
Zurita’s messianistic visions in Anteparadise—and more specifically in “Las
playas de Chile V”—“needs” to postpone the arrival of Redeemer and Paradise to preserve the possibility of justice. If in fact the teleological structure
drawing Chile’s destiny toward the emergence of a singular “justo” from the
collective, wounded national body were to “wash its hands” of “las heridas
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abiertas de mi patria” (Zurita 1997, 20) [my country’s open wounds (1984,
15)], then the way in which “todos los habitantes de Chile se habrían hecho
uno” [all Chile’s inhabitants would have / become one15] would trigger an
irresponsible erasure of the ethical call from this literary work. This erasure
would arise if the text were to dissolve and even annihilate the singularity
of the event of witnessing (by “washing one’s hands of it”), thereby calling
into question the relationship between the one (or One) and the many. At
the same time, the categorical Aufhebung (sublation or overcoming) signaled by this suggestion of the realization of Paradise’s perpetual peace
could only mark the collapse of the entire teleological system that originally
“promised” the advent of utopia through the arrival of the messiah. In this
way, the collective work to which Zurita refers in the Introductory Note
to Anteparadise (1984) is seen to open a futural Paradise (not a Paradise)
that would consider poetry to be a figure or analogy for the workings of
a Paradise that—at least in terms of Kant’s teleological system—can and
ought never be realized.
As we’ve seen in several different Kantian formulations, this quasiteleological move differs from an asymptotic approach to a regulative
Idea insofar as the necessary possibility of failure haunts the impossible
realization of its end. If the “end of the end” should constitute the worst
possible outcome (as the annihilation of the human race), then the kind
of conditions of (im)possibility argument at which we’ve arrived might be
better described by a series of “relationships” that play out in the work of
Jacques Derrida, in a way that engages the issues of justice, messianism,
and eschatology that we’ve been discussing in both Kant and Zurita. The
temporal hinge upon which this question rests in Zurita’s text is a function of the differential and deferred arrival of the “just one,” encompassing
a kind of difference (différance) that Derrida describes as absolutely and
temporally other (1982). The trace “structure” to which I’m referring here
is part and parcel of a nonempirical, horizon-less temporality that, in the
context of “Las playas de Chile V,” looks like the prefiguration of a messianism without messianicity (Derrida 2002a). This Blanchot-like formulation
speaks to the singular event of the advent of justice in the other’s unanticipated arrival, much like the uncertain emergence of a possible “justo”
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“[que] los pudiera revivir” (1997, 19) [who could revive them (1984, 15)] in
Zurita’s text. Furthermore, Derrida’s theorization of the messianic is open
to an interruption in history by a nonprophesied other with “no horizon
of expectation (regulative or messianic) . . . having perhaps an avenir, precisely [justement], a ‘to-come’ [à-venir] that one will have to [qu’il faudra]
rigorously distinguish from the future” (2002b, 257). The attempt to think
an empirically futural notion of an arrivant thus erases the radical temporal disjunction that would keep open the possibility of justice, losing
“the openness, the coming of the other (who comes), without which there
is no justice” and demonstrating the way in which the irreducibly futural
justice-to-come “opens up to the avenir the transformation, the recasting
or refounding [la refondation] of law and politics” (2002b, 257).
Admittedly, the relevance of these particular formulations of futurity and
justice to Zurita’s poetry in general is made more difficult due to Anteparadise’s obvious visionary character—Derrida in fact suggests that “[w]henever
a telos or teleology comes to orient, order, and make possible a historicity, it
annuls that historicity by the same token and neutralizes the unforeseeable
and incalculable irruption, the singular and exceptional alterity of what [ce
qui] comes, or indeed of who [qui] comes, that without which, or the one
without whom, nothing happens or arrives” (2005, 28). But does the radical
character of Anteparadise’s irruption from within the structure of history
(thus problematizing the realization of futural textual utopia in this text)
go so far as to reconfigure the temporality of messianism and Paradise in
poems like “Las playas de Chile V”? Does Anteparadise’s apparent prophetic
horizon end up annulling the possibility of a decision that would give rise to
the justice that in fact comes—or can the “interrupted” teleological system
we’ve highlighted in Kant’s writings on politics and judgment be read as a
way around the issue of the other’s horizon of expectation?
I think that a close reading of the equivocal, dissolving Utopias that
populate later poems in Anteparadise’s “Las playas de Chile” cycle will provide a response, of sorts, to these difficult questions. To return to the textual
economy of Zurita’s poetry, what appears to be a specific trajectory toward
the infinity of Paradise in “Las playas de Chile VII” brings to the forefront the
question of the collective in the poem’s multiple configurations of utopia:
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Muchos podrían haberlo llamado Utopía
porque sus habitantes viven solamente
de lo que comparten, de los trabajos
en las faenas de la pesca y del trueque.
Ellos habitan en cabañas de tablas a las
orillas del mar y más que con hombres
se relacionan con sus ánimas y santos que
guardan para calmar la furia de las olas.
Nadie habla, pero en esos días en que la
tormenta rompe, el silencio de sus caras
se hace más intenso que el ruido del mar
y no necesitan rezar en voz alta
porque es el universo entero su Santuario (1997, 24)
Many would have called it Utopia
because its inhabitants live only
by sharing, by their fishing labors
and by bartering.
They dwell in wood shacks by the
seaside and more than to men they
relate to the spirits and saints
they keep to calm the fury of the waves.
No one speaks, but on those days when
the storm is unleashed, the silence
on their faces becomes more intense
than the sound of the sea and they
need not pray aloud
because the entire universe is their cathedral (1984, 21)

Humankind’s rustic existence in this Utopia would, to a certain degree,
imply the radical dissolution of intersubjectivity. Interacting solely in the
supersensible realm with spirits and saints, the intense, oppressive silence
hardly puts us in the context of something like a Habermasian “ideal speech
situation” in which no utterance is possible. And if the linking of phrases is
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reduced to silent prayer in the face of an ominous, violent storm, then the
promise of this “nuevo Chile” echoed throughout the book starts to sound
like at least as much of a threat as the “old” Chile. Martin Hägglund discusses
a similar structure in the context of the “ends” of violence in Derrida’s work,
in which Derrida describes the necessary and fundamental convergence of
absolute peace and absolute violence:
In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever
happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as
Derrida argued already in “Violence and metaphysics.” Anything that would
finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a
universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would
end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea
of eliminating the undecidable future that is the condition for anything to
happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.
(Hägglund 2004, 49)

This conflation of the “end” of violence and absolute violence is also quite
prominent in “Las Playas de Chile X.” In this poem, we see a strong emphasis
on the blinding evanescence emanating from this new, quasi-eschatological
landscape in which the best account of futural vision actually comes from
the dissolve of these utopian images:
Porque la playa nunca se espejearía en sus ojos sino
mejor en el derramarse de todas las utopías como un
llanto incontenible que se le fuera desprendiendo del
pecho hirviente desgarrado despejando la costa que
Chile entero le vio adorarse en la iluminada de estos
sueños (1997, 29)
For the beach could never be better mirrored in his eyes than
in the spilling of all the utopias like an uncontrollable sob
seething rending heaved from his breast clearing the
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coast that all Chile saw him adore in the illumination of
these dreams (1984, 27)

If the optimal visionary outcome is construed here in terms of the dissolution of all utopias, then the uncontrollable sorrow and pain that accompanies the retreat of “un nuevo mundo que les fuera adhiriendo otra luz en
sus / pupilas empañadas erráticas alzándoles de frente el horizonte / que les
arrasó de lágrimas la cara” (1997, 28) [a new world fixing another light / to his
pupils blurred erratic raising before them the / horizon that covered his face
with tears (1984, 27)] shows the necessary possibility of failure built into the
move toward a Utopia that would be the destruction of all possible utopias
and of the relationality of human beings. The thought of erasing the call of the
Other that lines up with the address to “Usted” (“You,” in the formal sense) in
“Las playas consteladas” casts the heralded divine figure (as undifferentiated
God/Messiah) as the Utopia:
Donde ciegos cada vida palpó a tientas otra vida
hasta que ya no quedasen vidas sino sólo el vacío
esplendiéndoles la Utopía de entre los muertos
descarnados tocándose como el aire ante nosotros (1997, 31)
Where blind each life groped for another life until
there were no longer lives but only the void beaming
the Utopia from among the dead gaunt touching
each other like the air before us (1984, 31)

In the presence of these shifting temporal and spatial designations of
Utopia(s), the beaches are and are not the Utopia(s) constantly in flight—and
as a result speak to a joy in which
. . . ni yo ni Usted podríamos
decir si se nos había ido el alma entre
esos muertos desde donde emergiendo todo Chile
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palpó las Utopías como si ellas mismas fueran las
playas de nuestra vida transfiguradas albísimas
encumbrándonos la patria en la elevada dichosa de este
vuelo (1997, 31; my emphasis)
. . . neither you nor I could
tell if our souls had gone off among the dead whence all
Chile emerged groping for the Utopias as if they themselves
were the beaches transfigured pure white of our
lives exalting our country in the lofty joy of this
flight (1984, 31; my emphasis)

The difficulty in distinguishing between life and death rearticulates the
conditional hinge that transfigures, sublimates, and interrupts the tension
between redemption and total annihilation in this poem. Yet even in the
context of the images of rebirth that are so prominent toward the conclusion of the “Playas” cycle (including play with the obvious symbolism of the
color green in “Las playas de Chile XIV”), what appears to be a simultaneous
realization and holding back of the arrival of Utopia(s)/Messiah/Perpetual
Peace is always already determined by this haunting teleological progression.
And, in fact, these equivocations or interruptions built into Anteparadise’s teleological system are what preserve the futural decidability necessary to the
coming of justice, as Derrida rightly suggests in his discussions of the need to
preserve the uncertainty or undecidability of the “to-come” that comes.
When “Las utopías”—the next-to-last poem in the section with the same
title—does in fact “arrive,” what is at stake is the constant shifting locality
of an unrealizable resolution. In “Las utopías,” the incessant, transformative
flux of identity continually displaces any notion of the empirical present in
favor of what “could not be,” “what could have been,” and “what will be,” by
grammatically emphasizing the past tense (X pudo no ser Y), the conditional
perfect (X podría haber sido Y), and the future tense (X será Y). What appears
to be the potential for effortless reversibility between the physical sites of
Notre Dame, Chartres, Nuestra Señora de Santiago, Prayer, sky, desert, landscapes, heights, beaches, and breezes, in fact preserves the negotiation of
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futurity in a way that calls out for negation and deferral—in order to sustain
what is essentially a dangerous teleological process that cannot arrive at a
prophesied “end.”
In the last few stanzas, this poem’s passages and interstices seem to hint
at salvation through the awe-inspiring vision of Chile’s celestial love:
Donde Chile pudo no ser el paisaje de Chile pero sí el
cielo azul que miraron y los paisajes habrían sido
entonces un Ruego sin fin que se les escapa de los labios
largo como un soplo de toda la patria haciendo un
amor que les poblara las alturas
VII. Chile será entonces un amor poblándose las alturas
VIII. Hasta los ciegos verán allí el jubiloso ascender de su Ruego
IX. Silenciosos todos veremos entonces el firmamento entero
levantarse límpido iluminado como una playa tendiéndonos el
amor constelado de la patria (1997, 36–37)
Where Chile could be not Chile’s landscape but really the blue
sky they beheld and then the landscapes would have been an
endless Prayer long like a soft breeze escaping their
lips throughout the entire country making a love that could
fill the heights for them
VII. Chile will then be a love filling the heights for us
VIII. There even the blind will see the jubilant
ascent of their Prayer
IX. Silent we shall all then see the entire firmament
rise up limpid illuminated like a beach
holding forth the country’s star-spangled love (1984, 39)

The endless Prayer, articulated here as “un Ruego sin fin / que se les
escapa de los labios largo como un soplo” [an / endless Prayer long like a
soft breeze escaping their / lips] gives eyesight to the blind in its transformation of the Chilean landscape. Chile, according to “Las utopías’” formulation,
will become the silent love literally filling the celestial space, and will be
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transformed within the limits of the rising, clear firmament. The Utopias
transfigured here clearly occupy the “non-place” that their etymology suggests, in terms of the multiple diffractions of landscapes, heavens, and people
into fluid, exchangeable elements in this larger Utopian system. However,
the lack of differentiation, together with the exclusion of the present in the
forward-looking temporality of these Utopias, looks more like the threatening
collapse of life as we know it than Paradise—thus more closely resembling
a silent, collective “afterlife” than life. The undifferentiated, never simply
“present” futurity of the endless, ethereal Prayer in “Las utopías” recalls the
way in which the shifting temporal and spatial markers of utopia cannot
and dare not hone in on a fixed, predetermined Utopia in the “Las playas”
series, to suggest that the achievement of the ends of a teleological system
by means of ending teleology can only end badly. This is a formulation that
we’ve seen in Kant’s insistence on the nature of the death-encounter that
haunts these “ends,” in Derrida’s notion of the horizon-less “justice-to-come”
that nevertheless comes, and in the multiple, unrealizable visions of Paradise
that sustain futurity in Anteparadise.
Admittedly, the series of readings circulating in the critical economy of
the “Playas” cycle in Anteparadise represents only a portion of Zurita’s poetic
treatment of the sacred and scarred Chilean landscape. Nevertheless, a strong
case could be made for the way in which the trajectory of a self-inhibiting
teleological system moves through “Las cordilleras de Chile,” “Pastoral,” and
“Esplendor en el viento” in a similar tenor of engagement with questions
of justice, messianism, and eschatology. What becomes more prominent in
these later sections, however, is the identification between Zurita’s authorial
figure and poetic messianism—especially with respect to his self-mutilatory
blinding with acid (transfigured in his first book of poetry, Purgatorio, published in 1979), which gives rise to an almost Oedipal notion of the visionblindness dialectic that plays out in the textual space.
From a critical standpoint, what is recovered here is the alignment of
Zurita’s position in the Chilean poetic canon with the sacrifice-driven recuperation of hope for a fragmented nation living under military rule—as
described by many of the prominent critics of Zurita’s poetry, including Nelly
Richard, Ignacio Valente, Rodrigo Cánovas, William Rowe, and Idelber Avelar,
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among others. At the same time, what is gained by approaching Anteparadise
via of Kant’s teleological thinking and Derrida’s writings on justice and messianism, I think, is the possibility of accounting for the radical character of
a singular literary event that holds itself back from unequivocally espousing
the particular “call-to-action” that it “thinks” it’s proclaiming. Anteparadise
thus necessarily wavers in its announcement of empirically futural salvation,
and is actually more cautious in its depiction of the possibility and feasibility
of justice than initial readings might suggest. Even so, this investigation of
the way in which the “ends” of justice and morality play out in Anteparadise
is absolutely subject to the same sort of self-reflexive structural inadequacies
or internal contradictions pointed out by the close readings carried out in
Anteparadise’s reading of “itself.” And after all, one must recognize that what
plays at a final reading or end-point in this essay is in fact a discussion of a
teleological structure that does not play out as telos, that must never reach
its end, that in fact can never coincide temporally with its ends.

<
notes
I would like to thank Geoff Bennington for sharing his “generous reading” of teleology and
politics in Kant’s writings, as well as Carl Good and José Quiroga for their sharp and insightful
editing in this article. David Johnson’s suggestions relating to the question of teleology and
infinity in Kant and Derrida were also quite helpful.
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Quotes from Zurita’s poetry are taken from the sixth edition of Anteparaíso (1997) and
Jack Schmitt’s translation (Anteparadise, 1984).
Some of the more significant critical treatments of Zurita’s poetry include studies by
Nelly Richard (1986, 1994, 2004), Eugenia Brito (1990), Idelber Avelar (1999), Rodrigo
Cánovas (1985, 1986), William Rowe (1996, 2000), and Jill Kuhnheim (2005), as well as
a series of interesting (and quite conservative) reviews in the Chilean newspaper El
mercurio by Padre Ignacio Valente, official literary critic of Gen. Pinochet’s regime.
(Valente’s reviews in El mercurio are discussed in several studies on Zurita, including
Avelar’s [168].)
On Zurita and American space, see the work of William Rowe (2000).
Photos of the sky-written “lines” of “La vida nueva” are interspersed throughout the
book following section breaks, respecting the order of the poem.
Maurice Blanchot describes the way in which: “The question concerning the disaster
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6.

7.

8.

9.

is a part of the disaster: it is not an interrogation, but a prayer, an entreaty, a call for
help. The disaster appeals to the disaster that the idea of salvation, of redemption might
not yet be affirmed, and might, drifting debris, sustain fear. The disaster: inopportune”
(1995, 13).
This poem clearly evokes Genesis 18:23–33, in which Abraham “bargains” with God
regarding the salvation of the people of Sodom. In this passage, God agrees to spare
the inhabitants of Sodom if fifty righteous people are to be found within the city, then
forty-five, then forty, etc.—and Abraham eventually succeeds in reducing the number
to ten.
In the specific readings that I am proposing, the term “justice” is intricately linked to
the performative force of the law—as Jacques Derrida suggests, it is “an interpretive
force and a call to faith [un appel à la croyance]: not in the sense, this time, that law
would be in the service of force, its docile instrument, servile and thus exterior to the
dominant power, but rather in the sense of law that would maintain a more internal,
more complex relation to what one calls force, power or violence” (2002b, 241).
For a thorough discussion of the “guiding thread” in Kant’s philosophical writing, see
Geoffrey Bennington’s Frontières kantiennes (2000), especially the chapter titled “Le fil
conducteur (de la lecture philosophique).”
The tension between mechanical causality and teleology founds the antinomy presented
in §70 of the “Critique of Teleological Judgment” in the third Critique (1987):
The first maxim of judgment is this thesis: All production of material things and
their forms must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws.
The second maxim is this antithesis: Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws. (Judging them
requires a quite different causal law—viz., that of final causes. (267)

10.
11.

Although reason cannot prove either of these maxims, it looks at first as if the antinomy
is resolved in the following section, in Kant’s statement that this conflict is based on
“our confusing a principle of reflective judgment with one of determinative judgment,
and on our confusing the autonomy of reflective judgment . . . with the heteronomy
of determinative judgment” (270). Perhaps a key analogy, in terms of the theoretical
formulations in this essay, could be drawn between hermeneutical reading strategies
as more directly dependent on determinative judgment (despite their insistence otherwise), while this notion of the guiding thread speaks more to a principle of reflective
judgment.
See Derrida’s Specters of Marx (1994) for the most complete treatment of messianism,
justice, and the untimliness of the Other’s arrival.
The move toward morality at this point in the “Idea for a Universal History” is curious,
which seems to anticipate the link between politics, war, and morality in §83 in the third
Critique. Kant describes war in this later text in a way that resembles the formulation
in the “Idea for a Universal History”:
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“[War is] an unintentional human endeavor (incited by our unbridled passions),
yet it is also a deeply hidden and perhaps intentional endeavor of the supreme
wisdom, if not to establish, then at least to prepare the way for lawfulness along
with the freedom of states, and thereby for a unified system of them with a
moral basis.” (1987, 320)
12.

13.

14.
15.

This formulation evokes the opening sentence from Kant’s well-known essay “An Answer
to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” (as well as other statements in this piece):
“Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity” (1999a, 54).
This point recalls the Comment in §76 of the Critique of Judgment, specifically the distinction between the theoretical and the practical among Kant’s three odd “examples.”
Where the theoretical approaches the practical, a morality “worthy of its name” (to use
a more explicitly Derridean formulation) might very well be impossible; therefore “the
moral” would constitute morality holding itself back from achieving “full” morality.
At least in terms of the “Idea for a Universal History,” “Perpetual Peace,” and the third
Critique.
I have slightly modified Schmitt’s translation to emphasize the collective nature of
justice.
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